A New Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of the  Medical Malpractice  Amendments Reveals Potential Cures for Florida\u27s Ailing Citizen Initiative Process by Matthew, Eric S.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review
7-1-2006
A New Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of
the "Medical Malpractice" Amendments Reveals
Potential Cures for Florida's Ailing Citizen Initiative
Process
Eric S. Matthew
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric S. Matthew, A New Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of the "Medical Malpractice" Amendments Reveals Potential Cures for
Florida's Ailing Citizen Initiative Process, 14 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 331 (2005)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol14/iss2/5
A NEW PRESCRIPTION: HOW A THOROUGH DIAGNOSIS
OF THE "MEDICAL MALPRACTICE" AMENDMENTS
REVEALS POTENTIAL CURES FOR FLORIDA'S AILING
CITIZEN INITIATIVE PROCESS
ERIC S. MATTHEW*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 332
II. SELF MEDICATION: CITIZEN INITIATIVES IN FLORIDA ..... 334
A. Background: The Patient History ....................... 335
B. The "Medical Malpractice" Amendments ................ 336
1. Medical Liability Claimant's Compensation
Amendm ent .................................. 336
2. Patient's Right to Know About Adverse
M edical Incidents ............................. 337
3. Public Protection from Repeated Malpractice ...... 339
III. TREATMENT: MAKING AND CHANGING FLORIDA LAW .... 340
A. How to Amend by Citizen Initiative .................... 340
B. A Second Opinion:Judicial Checks and Balances ........... 342
1. Single-Subject Limitation ...................... 343
2. Ballot Title and Summary ...................... 345
IV. MISDIAGNOSIS AND RESULTING SIDE EFFECTS ........... 346
A. Counteracting Medications ............................ 347
B. Temporary Relief ................................... 349
C. Treating the Disease, Not the Patient .................... 350
V. FINDING A CURE .................................... 351
A. Preventative M edicine ............................... 354
1. Procedural Modifications ....................... 354
2. Creating A Statutory Initiative ................... 355
B. Palliative Care ..................................... 356
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................... 356
J.D., cum laude, University of Miami School of Law, 2006; BA, History, University of
California, Los Angeles, 2003. The author would like to thank the following people: my parents, Dr.Jon
and Hilary Matthew for their unconditional love, guidance and support; my friends for making law school
a little more tolerable and a lot more memorable; and the UNVERSrlY OF MIAMi BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
Executive and Editorial Board for all their hard work. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Will
Britt. Will, you would have made a worthy adversary on the other side of the courtroom. Of course, any
and all mistakes in this article are solely those of the author.
332 UNIVERSI7Y OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:331
I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida, the ability to make new law does not rest solely in the hands
of elected officials. Contrary to the traditional form of representative
government, the Florida Constitution authorizes citizens and special interest
groups to enact constitutional amendments using the citizen initiative
process.' This procedure places direct power in the hands of the voting
public and embraces the ideals of a direct democracy. However, amending
the state constitution by citizen initiative essentially allows initiative sponsors
to bypass all three branches of government when making laws and
dangerously circumvents bureaucratic checks and balances.2 Indeed, there
are many problems with Florida's present system.
In 1994, Florida citizens voted to amend the state constitution to protect
saltwater finfish, shellfish, and other marine animals. As a result, there is
presently a provision in the Florida Constitution prohibiting the use of mesh
fishing nets larger than 500 square feet.4 In the 2002 election, Florida citizens
voted to amend the state constitution to help prevent the cruel treatment of
animals, specifically pregnant pigs.' The Florida Constitution now requires
pregnant pigs to be kept in cages large enough to allow the pig to turn around
freely.6 Notwithstanding the purported merit of these laws, is there a
problem posed in that these issues are addressed via constitutional amend-
ments and not by legislatively enacted statutes?
In 2002, the majority of Florida voters supported a smoking ban
amendment7 sponsored by an anti-smoking group.' Not to be outdone,
cigarette companies and restaurants tried to propose a competing amendment
the very same election.9 The only reason the pro-smoking amendment did
I FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 3. See infta Part Il. This procedure is also known as the "ballot
initiative" process.
2 See id.
3 FLA. CONST. art. X, 516. ("[T]he people hereby enact limitations on marine net fishing in
Florida waters to protect saltwater finfish, shellfish, and other marine animals from unnecessary killing,
overfishing and waste.").
4 See id.
5 FLA. CONST. art. X, S 21. ("Inhumane treatment of animals is a concern of Florida citizens.
To prevent cruelty to certain animals ... the people of the State of Florida hereby limit the cruel and
inhumane confinement of pigs during pregnancy as provided herein.").
6 See id.
" FiA. CONST. art. X, S 20.
8 Smoke-Free for Health, Inc., the anti-smoking committee sponsoring this initiative, was able
to gain over 70% of the votes during the 2002 election. Details about this committee are available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetaii.asp?account=34548&seqnum= 1 (last visited Mar. 20,
2006).
9 The Committee for Responsible Solutions, backed by Philip Morris, proposed a deceptively
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not appear on the ballot is that its sponsors failed to obtain the requisite
number of signatures prior to the election.1" Is it a problem that procedural
constraints almost failed to prevent the public from voting on and potentially
passing two conflicting constitutional amendments, addressing identical
issues, during the same election?
Florida voters passed a constitutional amendment in 2000 that required
the state to construct a high-speed monorail or train linking the five largest
cities in Florida.1 For a brief period the Florida Constitution mandated a
state-sponsored, state-wide train system-the transportation amendment was
revoked in the last election.1 2 Is it a problem that the Florida Constitution
changes constantly and no longer provides a stable source of law? 3
Three citizen initiatives that address health care tort reform illustrate the
problems of allowing citizens to amend the constitution via initiative.
Colloquially known as the "medical malpractice" amendments, they were
added to the Florida Constitution in the 2004 election. The first amendment
limits attorney contingency fees in medical malpractice cases.1 4 The second
amendment creates a constitutional right for persons to have access to all
medical records concerning prior acts of physicians and nurses that may have
caused bodily injury or death to a former patient. 5 The final amendment,
referred to as the "three strikes" amendment, revokes the medical license of
any physician that is found to have committed three or more acts of
malpractice. 6 Using these amendments as a model to identify the
similar amendment aiming at restricting, rather than prohibiting, indoor smoking. Details about this
committee are available at http://election.dos.state.fl.usfinitiativesfinitdetail.asp?account=34830&
seqnum= 1 (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
10 Id.
" FLA. CONST. art. X S 19. Prior to its repeal, this amendment read in pertinent part:
High speed ground transportation system. -To reduce traffic congestion and provide
alternatives to the traveling public, it is hereby declared to be in the public interest that a high
speed ground transportation system consisting of a monorail, fixed guideway or magnetic
levitation system, capable ofspeeds in excess of 120 miles per hour, be developed and operated
in the State of Florida to provide high speed ground transportation by innovative, efficient and
effective technologies consisting of dedicated rails or guideways separated from motor
vehicular traffic that will link the five largest urban areas of the State.
12 FLA. CONST. art. X, S19.
13 See Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 1000(1993)
(McDonald,J., concurring) ("The legal principles in the state constitution inherently command a higher
status that any other legal rules in our society. By transcending time and changing political mores, the
constitution is a document that provides stability in the law and society's consensus on general
fundamental values.").
14 FLA. CONST. art. I, S 26.
is FLA. CONST. art. X, 525.
16 FLA. CONST. art. X, 526.
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insufficiencies of the initiative process, this Article argues that Florida should
implement specific procedural changes and encourage public debate on
initiatives to preserve the sanctity of the Florida Constitution without overly
impinging on the people's right of self-governance.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the citizen initiative in
Florida, and summarizes the medical malpractice amendments. Part III
critiques the procedural requirements of placing a citizen initiative on the
Florida ballot, and scrutinizes the forms ofjudicial review. Part IV identifies
what can happen when citizens myopically enact constitutional amendments
and fail to anticipate their long term effects. Part V dismisses several
potential procedural changes and suggests alternative ameliorative measures
to salve the ailing wounds of the citizen initiative process. Certainly the
public's right to make law is a paradigm of civil liberty. However, the
uncertain effect of the medical malpractice amendments upon Florida
citizens proves that this freedom cannot go unrestrained.
II. SELF MEDICATION: CITIZEN INITIATIVES IN FLORIDA
The initiative petition is one of five ways to amend the Florida
Constitution.1 However, Florida has not always extended the right to
propose amendments by initiative petition.18 In fact, the majority of states
still do not have a citizen initiative process. 9 Moreover, in most states that
have initiative procedures, citizens can amend the state constitution, state
17 In Article XI the Florida Constitution provides for amendment by (1) ajoint resolution agreed
to by three-fifths of the membership of each house of the Florida Legislature. FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 1;
(2) recommendation by the Constitutional Revision Commission that meets every twentieth year to
examine the constitution and make amendments as deemed necessary. FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 2; (3) a
constitutional convention FLA. CONST. art. X, S 4; (4) a recommendation from the Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission, which meets every tenth year since 1980. FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 6.; and (5) the
ballot initiative process. FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 3.
to For a detailed overview of the history of the Florida Constitution, see TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE,
THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE + EDITING INFORMATION (G. Alan Tarr ed.,
Greenwood Press) (1991). In short, the document established by constitutional convention in 1838 and
ratified by citizens the following year was the basic charter when Florida entered the Union in 1845. Id.
at 4. Notwithstanding changes to the Florida Constitution from statehood to post-reconstruction, in
1968, material alterations to the powers afforded to various branches of government essentially created
Florida's "modern" constitution. Id. at 12. That year, revisions added two new methods for amending the
constitution: a constitution revision commission and the initiative procedure. Id. at 13. Now, the Florida
Constitution has more methods of amendment than any other state constitution. Id. at 15.
19 See P. K. Jameson & Marsha Hosack, Citizen Initiatives in Florida: An Analysis of Florida's
Constitutional Initiative Process, Issues and Alternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 417, 432 (1995) (citing Tommy
Neal, The Voter Initiative, 1 NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES LEGiSBRIEF 38, Oct. 1993, at 1).
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statutes, or both.20  Florida is the only state that affords citizens the
opportunity to amend the constitution via direct initiative but does not allow
citizens the alternative route of the statutory initiative.2 Equally important
to note, Florida has a direct constitutional initiative process. Conversely, the
indirect process requires proposals be submitted to the Legislature before
being placed on the ballot.22 True, initiatives ultimately require approval of
the state's electorate, but the procedure in Florida lacks an effective filtering
mechanism inherent in a representative democracy. 2 Consequently, as each
passing election finds more and more citizens trying to shape and mold the
Florida Constitution, an increasing number actually succeed in doing so.
New laws are supposed to remedy bureaucratic deficiencies, but changing
the constitution does not always effectuate improvement.
A. Background: The Patient History
From 1968 to 1984,24 not one citizen initiative ever made it to the ballot.
From 1987 to 1996, ten initiatives made the ballot and seven were approved
by Florida voters.25 However, in the last two elections alone, 12 initiatives
made the ballot and all 12 passed.26 Though only one citizen initiative will
appear on the 2006 ballot,27 there were 49 active ballot initiatives with
See id.
21 See "State by State Comparison," http'.//www.votesmartflorida.org/votesmarthw/
hw.dll?page&file=state bystate (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
2 See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 15, S 273. Discussed infra Part V.
23 See Robert M. Norway,Judiial Review of Initiative Petitions in Florida, 5 FL. COASTAL L.J. 15
(2004). Norway cites to the 1997-1998 Constitutional Revision Commission where Governor Lawton
Chiles lamented "[We never imagined the proliferation of people paying to put initiatives on the ballot.
I think this practice flies in the face of what a representative democracy is supposed to be. I believe our
country was founded as a representative democracy-not a participatory democracy. There is a clear
difference. In a representative democracy, we elect officials to act on behalf of our people. It's an
important concept for us to understand." Id.
24 1968 was the first year the Florida Constitution permitted amendment by citizen initiative, but
an amendment was passed in 1972 requiring the language of the ballot initiatives to address "but one
subject and matter directly connected therewith." See FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 3. See also "A Look at the
Trend ofBallot Initiatives," http.//www.votesmartflorida.org/votesmarthw/hw.dll?page&file= trendbi (last
visited Mar. 20,2006).
25 See "A Look at the Trend of Ballot Initiatives," supra note 24.
2 Id.
D Amendment 4, which will appear on the 2006 ballot, is officially titled "Protect People,
especially youth, from addiction, disease, and other health hazards of using tobacco." The amendment
essentially seeks to utilize a greater percentage of Florida's tobacco settlement monies to create a
comprehensive, statewide tobacco education and prevention program. More information on Amendment
4 is available at http;//www.votesmartflorida.org/votesmartdocs/VSFVoterGuide_2006_Amendment4.pdf
(last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
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sponsors trying to gather the requisite signatures28 as of the February 1, 2006
deadline 2 9 Special interest sponsors are increasing their efforts and
expenditures towards passing initiatives-this was especially evident in the
2004 election.
B. The "Medical Malpractice" Amendments
On November 2, 2004, the public approved three ballot initiatives that
were ostensibly beneficial to the citizens of Florida. In reality, the passage of
Amendments 3, 7, and 8 resulted in discord, and repercussions of their far-
reaching influence are still not fully apparent. Prior to discussing the
backlash of the last election, however, it is imperative to examine each
amendment in greater detail.
1. MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMANT'S COMPENSATION AMENDMENT
Positioned on the ballot as Amendment 3,3' this initiative delineates
attorney caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice negligence
actions.3' In essence, the amendment affords a greater percentage of the
28 See FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, DIv. OF ELECTIONS, INITIATIVES / AMENDMENTS / REVISIONS,
http'//election.dos.stat.fl.usfinitiativesfinitiativelist.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2006) (Select "2006" as the
year and "Active" as status, then run query.).
29 The February 1st deadline for verifying signatures was implemented in the 2004 election with
the passage of a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment. As amended, the Florida Constitution
now provides:
(b) A proposed amendment or revision of this constitution, or any part of it, by initiative shall
be submitted to the electors at the general election provided the initiative petition is filed with
the custodian of state records no later than February 1 of the year in which the general election
is held.
FLA. CONST. art. X, S 5.
30 FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 1S-2.011 (2005). This administrative code provision outlining
constitutional amendment ballot positions reads in pertinent part:
(1) The Director of the Division of Elections shall assign in the following manner a
designating number to any proposed revision or amendment to the State Constitution for
placement on the general election ballot:
(a) The ballot position of each proposed revision or amendment shall correspond to the
designating number assigned by the director. A designating number may not be assigned to a
constitutional amendment by initiative until the Secretary of State has issued a certificate of
ballot position in accordance with s. 100.371, F.S.
Id.
31 The full text of the amendment reads:
Section 1. Article I, Section 26 is created to read 'Claimant's right to fair compensation.' In any
medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to receive no less
than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages received by the claimant, exclusive of
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damage award to the claimant.32  Florida already provides a statutory
limitation on the recovery of non-economic damages, 33 which are non-
financial losses, like pain and suffering.34 Limiting the percentage of recovery
and capping the total recovery created a financial quandary for plaintiffs and
their attorneys, although the voting public was markedly unaware of such a
problem.35
Trial lawyers spent nearly $25 million trying to defeat the measure,
suggesting this amendment would make Florida's health care system less safe
and effective by limiting access to the courts and costing taxpayer money to
help care for medical malpractice victims. 36 Needing only a simple majority,
Amendment 3 nevertheless passed easily with the support of the Florida
Medical Association.
2. PATIENT'S RIGHT TO KNOWABOUT ADVERSE MEDICAL INCIDENTS
Primarily supported by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amend-
ment 7 allows medical patients to access information about their doctor's
reasonable and customary costs, whether received by judgment, settlement, or otherwise, and
regardless of the number of defendants. The claimant is entitled to 90% of all damages in
excess of $250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs and regardless of the
number of defendants. This provision is self-executing and does not require implementing
legislation. This Amendment shall take effect on the day following approval by the voters.
FLA. CONST. art. I, S 26.
32 See id.
33 See FLA. STAT. S 766.202(8) (2005) (defines non-economic damages as "nonfinancial losses that
would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including pain and suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life,
and other nonfinancial losses to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general
law, including the Wrongful Death Act.").
34 See FLA. STAT. S 766.118(2) (2005). Generally, non-economic damages cannot exceed
$500,000 per claimant. However, if negligence results in permanent vegetative state or death, recovery
is extended to $1,000,000. In medical malpractice actions, those amounts are $750,000 and $1,500,000,
respectively. See FLA STAT. S 766.118(3) (2005). Occurrences of negligence involving emergency
medical treatment have a damage cap of $300,000. See FLA. STAT. S 766.118(4) (2005).
35 Discussed infra Part IV.
36 See Insurance Journal, "Florida Doctors, Lawyers at Odds Over Effect of Malpractice
Amendments," November 5, 2004, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2004/11/
05/47480.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
37 Officially sponsored by Citizens for a Fair Share, Inc., the top three contributors to this
initiative effort were the Florida Medical Association, Citizens for Tort Reform, and the American
Medical Association. In total, proponents of this measure spent approximately $9.1 million. See FLA.
DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, CITIZENS FOR A FAIR SHARE, INC.,
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/cgi-bin/comhtml.exe?account=37767 (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
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previous incidents of malpractice.38 Since the initiative passed, there has been
widespread confusion about its scope and application.39 In 2005, the Florida
Legislature passed the "Patients' Right-to-Know About Adverse Medical
Incidents Act" for the purpose of implementing the Amendment 7.40 This
statute merely clarifies the terminology in Amendment 7, which still gives
patients the right to review, upon request, records of health care facilities' or
providers' adverse medical incidents.4
38 FLA. CONST. art. X, S 25. This amendment reads:
(a) In addition to any other similar rights provided herein or by general law, patients have a
right to have access to any records made or received in the course ofbusiness by a health care
facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident.
(b) In providing such access, the identity of patients involved in the incidents shall not be
disclosed, and any privacy restrictions imposed by federal law shall be maintained.
(c) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) The phrases "health care facility" and "health care provider" have the meaning given
in general law related to a patient's rights and responsibilities.
(2) The term "patient" means an individual who has sought, is seeking, is undergoing, or
has undergone care or treatment in a health care facility or by a health care provider.
(3) The phrase "adverse medical incident" means medical negligence, intentional
misconduct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health care
provider that caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient, including, but not
limited to, those incidents that are required by state or federal law to be reported to any
governmental agency or body, and incidents that are reported to or reviewed by any health
care facility peer review, risk management, quality assurance, credentials, or similar
committee, or any representative of any such committees.
(4) The phrase "have access to any records" means, in addition to any other procedure for
producing such records provided by general law, making the records available for
inspection and copying upon formal or informal request by the patient or a representative
of the patient, provided that current records which have been made publicly available by
publication or on the Internet may be "provided" by reference to the location at which the
records are publicly available.
Id.
3 See infa Part IVA3. See, e.g.,FLA. SOC'YOF OPHTHALMOLOGYJUDGERULESAMENDMENT
SEVEN IS SELF IMPLEMENTING AND DOES NOT NEED LEGISLATIVE REVIEW,
http://www.mdeye.org/news/2426.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
40 See FLA. STAT. S 381.028 (2005).
41 However, in 2006, the Fifth District addressed the constitutionality of the statute. See Florida
Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, _ So.2d _, (5th DCA 2006), available at 2006 WL 566084.
Ultimately, that court determined that Amendment 7 was "self-executing, thus the 'enabling legislation'
passed by the Legislature (S 381.028) which effectively eviscerated the Constitutional provision was
subordinate to the plain meaning ofthe Amendment." Scott R. McMillen, Fifth DCA Upholds Amendment
7-Patients Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, 507 ACADEMY FLA. TRIAL LAw.J. 20 (2005).
Additionally, the Fifth District certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court as matters of great
public importance:
1) DOES AMENDMENT 7 PREEMPT STATUTORY PRIVILEGES AFFORDED
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' SELF-POLICING PROCEDURES TO THE EXTENT
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3. PUBLIC PROTECTION FROM REPEATED MALPRACTICE
Lastly, Amendment 8 creates a "three strikes" system where Florida now
revokes the medical license of any physician found to have committed three
or more incidents of medical malpractice.42 Those supporting the
amendment suggest the amendment benefits patients by eliminating
repeatedly negligent physicians from practicing medicine in the state.
Conversely, those opposing the amendment opine that the amendment
limits patients' access to quality care because practicing physicians in high-
risk fields, such as gynecologists, neurosurgeons, and trauma surgeons will
leave Florida.43 Like Amendment 7, the three strikes amendment also
required legislative efforts to implement the initiative. 44 Injune of 2005, the
THAT INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH THOSE PROCEDURES IS
DISCOVERABLE DURING THE COURSE OF LITIGATION BY A PATIENT
AGAINST A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER?
2) IS AMENDMENT 7 SELF-EXECUTING?
3) SHOULD AMENDMENT 7 BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY?
Florida Hospital Waterman, 2006 WL 566084, at *9. Almost two years after the passage of Amendment 7,
a myriad of issues remain unsolved.
42 FLA. CONST. art. X, S 26. The amendment reads:
(a) No person who has been found to have committed three or more incidents of medical
malpractice shall be licensed or continue to be licensed by the State of Florida to provide
health care services as a medical doctor.
(b) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) The phrase "medical malpractice" means both the failure to practice medicine in Florida
with that level of care, skill, and treatment recognized in general law related to health care
providers' licensure, and any similar wrongful act, neglect, or default in other states or
countries which, if committed in Florida, would have been considered medical malpractice.
(2) The phrase "found to have committed" means that the malpractice has been found in a
final judgment of a court or law, final administrative agency decision, or decision of binding
arbitration.
Id.
4 See generally William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice
Premiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465 (outlining the issues of the present health care crisis byjuxtaposing
the views of physicians and lawyers).
4 See FLA. STAT. S 456.50 (2005). This statute reads in pertinent part:
(2) For purposes of implementing s. 26, Art. X of the State Constitution, the board shall not
license or continue to license a medical doctor found to have committed repeated medical
malpractice, the finding of which was based upon clear and convincing evidence. In order to
rely on an incident of medical malpractice to determine whether a license must be denied or
revoked under this section, if the facts supporting the finding of the incident of medical
malpractice were determined on a standard less stringent than clear and convincing evidence,
the board shall review the record of the case and determine whether the finding would be
supported under a standard of clear and convincing evidence.
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Florida legislature enacted an elucidatory statute establishing a clear and
convincing standard for determining whether alleged negligence qualifies as
a "strike."
41
III. TREATMENT: MAKING AND CHANGING FLORIDA LAW
A. How to Amend by Citizen Initiative
The medical malpractice amendments, considering their strong political
and financial backing, predictably made the 2004 ballot in large part because
the prerequisites of placing an initiative on the ballot Florida are not
sufficiently stringent.' Specifically, the authority to amend the Florida
Constitution is expressed in Article XI, Section 3, which reads:
The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or
portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people,
provided that any such revision or amendment, except for those
limiting the power of government to raise revenue, shall embrace
but one subject and matter directly connected therewith. It may be
invoked by filing with the custodian of state records a petition
containing a copy of the proposed revision or amendment, signed by
a number of electors in each of one half of the congressional districts
of the state, and of the state as a whole, equal to eight percent of the
votes cast in each of such districts, respectively and in the state as a
whole in the last preceding election in which presidential electors
were chosen.47
Corresponding legislative statutes also govern the initiative process. Osten-
sibly a bureaucratic nightmare, complying with the myriad of procedural
requirements is actually quite feasible.
First, the sponsor of an initiative must register as a political committee
with the Florida Division ofElections .4 But, before this political committee
can circulate a petition for signatures, the Secretary of State needs to approve
45 See id.
46 Discussed infra Part V.
47 FLA. CONST. art. X. S 3.
48 See FA STAT. S 100.371(3) (2005); FLA. STAT. S 106.03 (2005). The sponsor needs to file a
statement of organization that lists affiliated interest groups, the scope or jurisdiction of the committee
or sponsor, the names of principal officers, and certain details about the committee funds. See S 106.03.
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the substance and ballot title of the proposed amendment.49 However,
review of the petition applies only to form, and not to its legal sufficiency."0
The substance of an amendment must be written in "clear and
unambiguous language" before it gains ballot position.1 The ballot title must
be no more than 15 words and the ballot summary detailing the purpose of
the amendment must not exceed 75 words.52 Once the format is approved,
the sponsors can start circulating the petition. Some suggest enough money
almost guarantees an initiative will at least make the ballot: "There's a
loophole in the Constitution that someone with enough money can use to
buy their way through. You can buy signatures for about $4 million and be
guaranteed a spot on the ballot." 3
The minimum number of signatures needed for an initiative to be placed
on the ballot must equal eight percent of the number of the ballots cast in the
last presidential election. 4 When the petition receives 10% of the required
signatures, the petition is submitted to the Supervisors of Elections in the
appropriate counties for signature verification. 5 After the Supervisor of
Elections in the appropriate counties verifies the authenticity of the
signatures5 6 the Secretary of State submits the petition to the Attorney
General. 7
The Attorney General, in turn, requests an advisory opinion from the
Florida Supreme Court regarding compliance with the proposed ballot and
49 FLA. STAT. S 101.161(2) (2005);
so FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 1S-2.009(1) (2005).
51 FLA. STAT. S 101.161(1) (2005).
52 Id.
53 See Abby Goodnough, Florida Legislators Take on a VoterRight, N.Y. TIMES NATIONAL, April 26,
2004. Goodnough cites to Senior Vice President of the Florida Chamber of Commerce who further
laments, "All we are asking for are some checks and balances." Id.
S4 FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 3. Moreover, the signatures cannot come from people in only one or
two locations; the number must come from at least half of the state's 25 congressional districts. See also
FiA DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, INITIATIVE PETITION PROCESS FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, http'//election.dos.state.fl.usainitiatives/faq.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
s5 FLA. STAT. 515.21 (2005). See generally FLA. CONST. art. X, S 3.
56 FLA. STAT. 5 100.371(4) (2005). See also FLA. STAT. S 99.097 (describing the process for
verifying signatures); FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 1S-2.0091 (2005) (discussing signature collection
verification and deadlines).
57 The Secretary of State must immediately submit the petition to the Attorney General and to
the Financial Impact Estimating Conference if the sponsor (i) registered as a political committee; (ii)
submitted the ballot title, substance, and text of the proposed revision or amendment to the Secretary of
State; and (iii) obtained a letter from the Division of Elections confirming that the sponsor has submitted
to the appropriate supervisors for verification and the supervisors have verified that the forms signed and
dated equal to 10 percent of the number of electors statewide and in at least one-fourth of the
congressional districts pursuant to the State Constitution. FLA. STAT. S 15.21 (2005).
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format requirements."8 Ifthe Court approves the petition, the proponent can
gather the rest of the signatures needed to place the initiative on the ballot.
Essentially, the citizen initiative passes through various hands, but at no point
does Florida law even allow, let alone require, state officials to review or
identify potential deficiencies the substance of the amendments. 9 The
aforementioned procedural requirements provide little resistance to a well-
funded and determined sponsor with a directive that emanates at least some
practicality.
B. A Second Opinion:Judicial Checks and Balances
Judicial safeguards, in many respects, are also lacking. The Court cannot
review the substance of a petition's content (which is somewhat alarming
considering there is no executive veto power) and citizen initiatives are not
filtered by the rigorous process of committee review or floor debates.' At
present, the Court reviews initiatives only to determine (1) whether the
petition satisfies the single-subject requirement of the Florida Constitution;
and (2) whether the ballot title and summary are printed in clear
unambiguous language, as required by statute."
58 The Florida Constitution provides:
The attorney general shall, as directed by general law, request the opinion of thejustices of the
supreme court as to the validity of any initiative petition circulated pursuant to Section 3 of
Article XI. The justices shall, subject to their rules of procedure, permit interested persons to
be heard on the questions presented and shall render their written opinion no later than April
1 of the year in which the initiative is to be submitted to the voters pursuant to Section 5 of
Article XI.
FLA. CONST. art. IV, S 10. Notably, the April 1 deadline was not implemented until the 2004 election
with the passage of a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment. In fact, FIA STAT. S 16.061 (2005)
makes no mention of the new deadline, and reads:
The Attorney General shall, within 30 days after receipt of a proposed revision or amendment
to the State Constitution by initiative petition from the Secretary of State, petition the
Supreme Court, requesting an advisory opinion regarding the compliance of the text of the
proposed amendment or revision with s. 3 Art. Xl of the State Constitution and the
compliance of the proposed ballot title and substance with s. 101.161. The petition may
enumerate any specific factual issues which the Attorney General believes would require a
judicial determination.
FLA. STAT. S 16.061 (2005).
s9 See infra Part IV.
60 See, e.g., S.B. 608, 108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (amending statute 381.026); STAFF, S.
JUDICIARY CoMM., ANALYSIs AND ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT, 108-938, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005).
61 See FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 3. See also FL.A STAT. S 101.161(1) which provides:
Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the
people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear and
unambiguous language on the ballot after the list of candidates, followed by the word "yes" and
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In addressing these two issues, the Court's inquiry is governed by several
general principles. First; the Court does not consider or address the merits
or wisdom of the proposed amendment.62 Second, "[t]he Court must act
with extreme care, caution, and restraint before it removes a constitutional
amendment from the vote of the people." 3 Essentially, the Court can only
invalidate a proposed amendment that is clearly and conclusively defective.'
The Florida Supreme Court has no choice but to approve well-drafted
amendments that comply with these basic tenets,65 and is constrained from
even purporting an opinion as to the potential ramifications of inept
initiatives. 66
1. SINGLE-SUBJECT LIMITATION
Florida law requires that an amendment proposed by initiative "shall
embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith." 67 To
comply with this single-subject requirement, a proposed amendment must
manifest a "logical and natural oneness ofpurpose."68 In essence, the purpose
of this requirement is to prevent logrolling6 9 and limit the scope of an
amendment so it will not institute extreme governmental or constitutional
change.7' Because of this single-subject limitation, the Supreme Court can
only keep an initiative off the ballot if (1) it substantially alters or performs
the functions of multiple branches of government; 71 (2) it affects other
also by the word "no," and shall be styled in such a manner that a "yes" vote will indicate
approval of the proposal and a "no" vote will indicate rejection.
See also, e.g., Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 890-91 (Fla.2000).
62 See, e.g., Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d at 891.
63 Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982).
SeeAdvisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Right to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-Violent Drug
Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491,498-99 (Fla. 2002).
65 See Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents,
880 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 2004); Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Public Protection From Repeated Malpractice,
880 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2004); Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re The Medical Liability Claimant's
Compensation Amendment, 880 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2004).
See 880 So. 2d at 623 ("M[We approve the amendment for placement on the ballot. We note,
however, that no other issue is addressed here, and this opinion should not be construed as expressing
either favor for or opposition to the proposed amendment.").
67 FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 3.
68 Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 990 (Fla. 1984).
69 See Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Ltd. Casinos, 644 So. 2d 71, 73 (Fla. 1994) (defining
"logrolling" as a practice where an amendment is proposed which contains unrelated provisions that may
influence the electorate to pass an otherwise disfavored provision).
7 See Norway, supra note 23, at 24. See also Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. - Save Our Everglades,
636 So. 2d 1336, 1340. (Fla. 1994).
71 See Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Tax Limitation, 644 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 1994).
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articles or sections of the constitution;72 or (3) disparate portions of the
initiative do not have a "natural relation and connection as component parts
or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme."73
There are numerous shortcomings with this method ofjudicial scrutiny.
First, a political committee desiring more than one measure merely has to
propose separate initiatives to avoid the single-subject requirement.74 In fact,
Floridians for Patient Protection, the political committee affiliated with the
Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, easily skirted the Court's policy of
prohibiting extreme constitutional change by filing eight different petitions
in 2004.7s Two initiatives that committee sponsored, Amendment 7 and
Amendment 8, reached the ballot and are now part of the Florida
Constitution.76 The rationale of avoiding extreme constitutional change is
meaningless if the Court is powerless to effectively support it.
Also problematic is that nothing prevents multiple parties from
proposing citizen initiatives on the identical topic.77 In 2002, Florida voters
narrowly avoided having to choose between two deceptively similar anti-
smoking initiatives.7" Moreover, there is no guarantee that the electorate
7 Id.
73 Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990 (quoting City of Coral Gables v. Gray, 19 So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla. 1944))
("Unity of object and plan is the universal test.").
74 See generally Jim Smith, So You Want to Amend the Florida Constitution? A Guide to Initiative
Petitions, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1509 (1994) (providing an additional overview to methods and procedures of
amending the Florida constitution).
75 See FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, INITIATIVES / AMENDMENTS / REVISIONS,
http;//election.dos.state.fl.usfinitiativesfinitiativelist.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2006) (Select "2006" as the
year, "All" as status, and "Floridians for Patient Protection" as sponsor, then run query.).
76 FLA. CONST. art.X, S 25,26.
77 See supra Part I.
78 The ballot title and summary for FLA. CONST. art. X, S 20 (1968) reads:
Ballot Title: Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Tobacco Smoke by
Prohibiting Workplace Smoking. Ballot Summary: To protect people from the health hazards
of second-hand tobacco smoke, this amendment prohibits tobacco smoking in enclosed indoor
workplaces. Allows exceptions for private residences except when they are being used to
provide commercial child care, adult care or health care. Also allows exceptions for retail
tobacco shops, designated smoking guest rooms at hotels and other public lodging
establishments, and stand-alone bars. Provides definitions, and requires the legislature to
promptly implement this amendment.
Id. The ballot title and summary for the proposed amendment by the committee backed by Philip Morris
read:
Ballot Title: Smoking Prohibited in Certain Indoor Workplaces and Restricted in Restaurants
and Other Indoor Workplaces. Ballot Summary: This amendment prohibits smoking in certain
enclosed indoor workplaces and restricts smoking in restaurants and other enclosed indoor
workplaces. It gives business owners or persons in charge of certain enclosed indoor
workplaces the ability to designate limited smoking areas, provided the smoking policy is
clearly communicated. It exempts non-commercial private residences, retail tobacco shops,
2006] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE & FLORIDA INITIATIVES 345
approves one law and strikes down the other, especially if the underlying
conflicts are not readily apparent. Even more troublesome is when multiple
parties propose ballot initiatives that indirectly conflict.79 In light of the fact
that Florida law does not require or encourage public debate over initiatives,
voters may be wholly unaware that multiple initiatives dealing with
seemingly distinct issues, like the medical malpractice amendments, actually
overlap in scope.'
2. BALLOT TITLE AND SUMMARY
To combat concerns about proper notice to the voting public, the Florida
Supreme Court determines whether an initiative's ballot title and summary
accurately reflect the purpose and intended consequence of a proposed
amendment.81  In examining the validity of a proposed amendment, the
Court looks at (1) whether the ballot title and summary fairly inform the
voter of the chief purpose of the amendment, 2 and (2) whether the language
of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public. 3 Only in theory do
these queries help ensure voters are adequately informed of the effects of a
proposed initiative.'
In practice, the language of the title and summary are inherently
misleading because of the word limitation. 5 Limiting the ballot title is
sensible, but attempting to aptly summarize an amendment's purpose and
effect in 75 words or less is futile and unnecessarily impractical. As it stands,
the Supreme Court has insufficient authority to determine whether an
amendment's summary appropriately informs the electorate of both the
amendment's short term, and potential long term effects.
private offices, designated rooms in lodging establishments, and bars. It defines relevant terms.
See FLA- DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, INITIATIVES / AMENDMENTS / REVISIONS,
http;//election.dos.statcf.usfinitiative/initdetail.asp?account=34830&seqnum=l (last visited Mar. 6
2006).
79 See infra Part IV.
80 Id.
81 See FLA. STAT. S 16.061.
8 See, e.g., Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Right to Treatment and Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug
Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491,497 (Fla. 2002).
83 See, e.g., Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. In re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers,
705 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998).
84 See, e.g., Advisory Op. to Atty. Gen. In re Fairness Initiative, 880 So. 2d 630, 636 (Fla. 2004)
("[We have concluded that the proposed amendment violates the single-subject rule ... the proposed
amendment operates in a way that could essentially create a tax on services if the Legislature fails to enact
specific exclusions ... a voter must be directly informed of such an important consequence.").
85 See FLA. STAT. S 101.161(1).
346 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:331
Since the Supreme Court cannot review the merits of a proposed
amendment, the voting public is not afforded the benefit of judiciary
foresight.8 6 This too is problematic in light of the fact that both Amendment
7 and Amendment 8 were not self-implementing initiatives and required
legislative clarification before they took effect.' Although the medical
malpractice amendments survived single-subject scrutiny, there was no
procedural safeguard in place to examine the legality of the implementing
statutes because they were codified after the initiatives were added to the
constitution. as In essence, the electorate votes on laws that will (in some
cases) require implementing statutes which the Court may know in advance
will not pass constitutional muster.
IV. MISDIAGNOSIS AND RESULTING SIDE EFFECTS
Perhaps the most lacking element of the Florida initiative process is that
no law requires disseminating information about potential long-term
ancillary effects of passing individual or multiple initiatives. Each medical
malpractice amendment in and of itself appeared conflict free and certain to
improve the lives of Florida citizens: more money goes to the victim in
medical malpractice suits; patients have the right to know if their doctor has
been involved in prior instances of malpractice; repeatedly negligent doctors
can no longer practice medicine in Florida. Unfortunately, most citizens
were unaware of the potential downsides of enacting these initiatives, such
as problems with the amendments conflicting with each other, and problems
with the amendments individually.
Competing interest groups can (and will) continue to campaign for
discordant constitutional amendments. Logic suggests that if two amend-
ments are truly contradictory, the electorate will favor one and fail to vote for
the other. This notion overlooks the fact that conflicting amendments may
seem facially harmonious. Unfortunately, this happened in 2004 and the
86 See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990.
87 The Supreme Court of Florida enunciated the test for determining whether a constitutional
provision is self-executing. The basic guide, or test, in determining whether a constitutional provision
should be construed to be self-executing, or not self-executing, is whether or not the provision lays down
a sufficient rule by means of which the right or purpose which it gives or is intended to accomplish may
be determined, enjoyed, or protected without the aid of legislative enactment. If the provision lays down
a sufficient rule, it speaks for the entire people and is self-executing. Gore v. Bryant, 125 So.2d 846, 851
(Fla. 1960).
88 Cf. Thomas Horenkamp, The New Medical Malpractice Legislation and its Likely Constitutional
Challenges, 58 U.MIA.L.REv. 1285 (2004) (discussing feasible constitutional challenges to the medical
malpractice amendments).
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medical malpractice amendments passed without sufficient discussions on
how to resolve long-term conflicts.
A. Counteracting Medications
For example, one problem Florida citizens failed to sufficiently address
was the inevitable clash between Amendment 3 and Amendment 8 within
the insurance industry. In short, liability insurance, also called "third party"
insurance, covers claims brought against the policyholder.8 9 Physicians
purchase two types of medical malpractice insurance because of potentially
crippling malpractice suits.9° General indemnity coverage protects against
having to pay a judgment while defense coverage safeguards against the
insured having to pay the legal costs of defending the underlying claim.9' The
tripartite relationship between the insurer, the insured defendant, and the
insurance defense lawyer, however, is hardly symbiotic because multiple
parties have competing interests and duties; there are also the interests of the
plaintiff to consider.'
Citizens passed Amendment 3 to shift damage awards to injured patients
and passed the "three strikes" amendment to protect patients from repeatedly
negligent doctors. Instead, these amendments exacerbated the strained
relationship between litigants in medical malpractice actions and added to the
conflict already inherent in liability insurance.93
89 Seegenerally TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAWAND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS
409-477 (lst ed. 2003) (providing a broad overview of the general principles of liability insurance).
9D See Gunnar, supra note 43, at 470, 471.
91 See BAKER, supra note 89, at 407.
One potential conflict is when the duties of the insurer under the insurance contract conflict
with the duties of the attorney to the client. See generally Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers'
Professional Responsibilities: Part I-F-xcess Fxposure Cases, 78 TEx. L. REV. 599 (2000) (providing an overview
of one of the potential fields of conflict where adverse judgments may exceed policy limits). The
attorney's duty to the insurer (who is paying his bills) may conflict with the duty to the insured (who is
a potential defendant). See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 917-918 (3d ed.
2002).
In addition, Tom Baker suggests that when analyzing "the stresses on the liability insurance
relationship, it is not enough to think about the professional responsibility triangle (the insurance defense
lawyer, the insured defendant, and the liability insurance company). The tort plaintiff must be factored
in as well." BAKER, supra note 89, at 562.
93 Injured plaintiffs will struggle to find representation for medical malpractice claims. U.S.
News and World Report reported the findings of the Physician Insurers Association of America in 2002:
in a sample of 5524 malpractice cases, 27.4% were settle before trial, 67.7% were dropped or dismissed,
4% ended in a verdict for the defendant, and only 0.9% resulted in jury verdicts for the plaintiff
Christopher H. Schmitt, A Medical Mistake, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 30, 2003, at 24-27. Thus,
even in the unlikely event a malpractice case makes it to trial, the injured party only has a 20% chance of
a favorable verdict.
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A plaintiff's counsel working for a contingency fee is typically
compensated one-third of the amount awarded to the injured patient at the
time of settlement or jury award. However, the expense is great: on average,
the attorney's cost of bringing the case of an injured plaintiff to trial is
between $35,000 and $50,000. 9 Considering the high cost to litigate, the
unlikely result of a favorable outcome, and Amendment 3 now shifting
damage awards to the injured patient, attorneys will inevitably pressure
clients to settle cases.95 In that same vein, an attorney can also have clients
waive their constitutional rights in Amendment 3. In fact, the Florida
Supreme Court recently ordered The Florida Bar to develop a rule providing
guidelines for client waiver of the provisions of the medical malpractice
amendment reapportioning attorney fees.96
Meanwhile, the "three strikes" amendment threatens the livelihood of
potential physician defendants97 and pits defendants against their insurance
carriers. Conversely, physicians will invariably opt to settle cases, rather than
risk an adversejury finding of malpractice which could potentially lead to the
State revoking their license to practice medicine. Insurance companies
generally retain the right to defend a malpractice action,98 and therein lay
Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Innovative PracticeApplications, 6 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L.
309,311 (2003).
% See Gunnar, supra note 43, at 480.
%6 The three core features are as follows:
1. An acknowledgement of the provisions of article 1, section 26 of the Florida Constitution;
2. An affirmative obligation on the part of an attorney contemplating a contingency fee contract
with a potential client to notify any potential client with a medical liability claim of the
provisions of article 1, section 26. Such notice provision may include a standard written notice
form; and
3. A procedure whereby a medical liability claimant may knowingly and voluntarily waive the
rights granted by article 1, section 26. Such a proposed procedure may involve judicial
oversight or review of the waiver and may include a standard waiver form or otherwise provide
for the protection of the rights of a potential client.
See In re: Amendment to the Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar-Rule 4-1.5(o(4)(B) of the Rules of Prof'l
Conduct; Case No. SCO5-1150, (Fla. 2005). See also, FloridaBar.org, Court tell Bar to draft waiver for
Amendment 3, THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS Uan. 1, 2006) http;//www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/
jnnews01.nsf/0/f~accld4f34df491852570e5O054489f?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 23,2006); Kenneth
D. Kranz, Cases and Commentaries, 504 AcADEMYF/.A TRIAL LAw.J. 8 (2005).
97 FLA. CONST. art. X, S 26.
98 See BAKER, supra note 89, at 508. Douglas Richmond, an insurance defense and coverage
lawyer, further explains the benefits of an insurer retaining the right to control the defense in a negligence
suit:
Insurers' control of the defense allows them to participate in strategic decisions that might
otherwise be made solely by counsel or their insureds. Defense control in a broader sense
allows insurer to defeat baseless claims, to expose and defeat overstated claims, to discourage
or minimize future litigation against their insureds by defending aggressively and thus
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another conflict: the physician wanting to settle to avoid a potential strike
versus an insurance company's duty to settle a claim on behalf of its insured.
This Article does not attack the validity or purported value of
Amendment 3 or Amendment 8. The real problem is the lack of in-depth
analysis that would have allowed Florida citizens to make an informed
decision. Of course, citizens may well have enacted the medical malpractice
amendments regardless of potential consequences. Still, the myriad of easily
identifiable conflicts between these amendments warranted a greater deal of
scrutiny from medical, legal, and insurance experts. The present system fails
in this respect.
B. Temporary Relief
In medicine, there is a phenomenon known as the "placebo effect." A
patient's symptoms can be alleviated by an otherwise ineffective treatment
because the individual expects or believes that it will work." Unfortunately,
the Florida electorate supported an ineffective treatment, and despite lofty
expectations, Amendment 8 will not amount to a long-term solution.
Citizens assumed Amendment 8 would improve Florida's health care system
by ridding it of bad doctors. In hindsight, the Florida electorate was fed an
empty cure void of any substance.
Physicians have experienced an annual increase in overhead costs to
maintain offices, personnel, and malpractice insurance premiums, which
have risen dramatically over the past decade with exceptional rate increases
in the past two years."° Now physicians in Florida are also faced with the
possibility of losing their medical license. To avoid liability, physicians will
take precautionary measures and practice defensive medicine.1"' This risk-
management style of medical practice has resulted in a dramatic increase in
the cost of medical care to both the individual patient and society as a
whole.1" The 'impact of physician shortages will be noticeable for years to
come.
10 3
becoming known as a tough adversary or unappealing target.
Douglas Richmond, Liabilitylnsurer'sRight oDefend Theirlnsureds, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115,116 (2001).
9 The definition of"placebo effect" is available at httpV'/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Placebo-effect (last
visited January 23, 2006).
100 See Gunnar, supra note 43, at 471.
101 Id.
102 One study reveals that defensive medicine accounted for five to fifteen billion dollars of
unnecessary medical costs per year, primarily through ordering of diagnostic tests for legal, rather than
medical purposes. Neville M. Bilimoria, New Medicine for Medical Malpractice: The Empirical Truth About
Legislative Initiatives for Medical Malpractice Reform - Pan I, 27J. HEALTH L. 268 (1994).
103 Steven G. Friedman, Anyone in the O.R.?, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at A29. Dr. Gunnar
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Perhaps opposition groups could have campaigned against the passage of
Amendment 8 by informing the public of potential side-effects. However,
considering that initiatives only need a majority to pass, interest groups
probably concluded that it was easier to promote their own amendment (in
this case, Amendment 3) rather than spending resources trying to discredit
an amendment the group does not support. Too often, citizens are left with
a 75-word ballot summary as the primary source of information concerning
the present and future application of an initiative. Again, the underlying
rationale of removing repeatedly negligent physicians may ultimately prove
successful; only time will tell. But the painfully simplistic ballot summary
fails to adequately summarize the potential effects of amendments."
C. Treating the Disease, Not the Patient
A complex illness attacks on many fronts, so defenses must be multi-
faceted; one cannot focus all energies on treatment alone.' Amendment 7,
spearheaded by Florida trial attorneys, gives patients "access to any records
made or received in the course of business by a health care facility or
provider relating to any adverse medical incident. " 10 6 Many defense lawyers
and health care professionals actually believe the amendment was proposed
in direct response to Amendment 3.'07 Metaphorically speaking, the
electorate inadvertently supported Amendment 7 which treats the disease
describes the problems Florida will soon face:
Public access to health care is of considerable concern as increasing numbers of physicians
move to states with lower malpractice premium rates, limit their practice to lower risk
procedures, or quit altogether. Of future concern to the delivery of healthcare is the negative
effect financial expectations and lifestyle considerations have on influencing physician training
in the fields of obstetrics and gynecology, general surgery, and surgical subspecialties,
particularly neurosurgery, thoracic surgery, and cardiovascular surgery.
Gunnar, supra note 43, at 476.
104 The ballot summary for Amendment 8 stated:
Current law allows medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice to be licensed
in practice medicine in Florida. This amendment prohibits medical doctors who have been
found to have committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice from being licensed
to practice medicine in Florida.
See FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, INIrIATIvES / AMENDMENTS / REVISIONS, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/fulltext/pd/35169-8.pdf (last visited March 23, 2006).
105 Dr. Lee Jong-wook & James T. Morris, AIDS: Treat the Patient, Not the Disease, WHO
CONSULTATION ON NUTRITION AND HIV/AIDS, http://www.sahims.net/doclibrary/
SahimsDocuments/050412_whojkl.doc (last visited January 23, 2006).
106 FLA. CONST. art. X, S 25.
107 SeeJames Sawran & Robert Weill,Amendment 7: Will the Patient's Right to Know Come at Too High
a Price?, 24 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7 (2005).
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(tort reform hindering plaintiff attorneys) instead of the patient (health care
as a whole).
Amendment 7 may ultimately decrease the quality of health care because
it effectively strips away various statutorily-privileged devices designed to
analyze and improve the quality of physicians and treatment.'08 On its
surface, Amendment 7 aids injured patients in acquiring vital information
concerning potential lawsuits. But the fact that Amendment 7 advocates so
easily downplayed the obvious importance of privilege in the medical setting
further exhibits the initiative system's shortcomings. Once again, this Article
is not critiquing the theoretical advantages of increased discovery for injured
patients, but merely suggesting that the initiative process should, at least to
some degree, facilitate debate on such obviously crucial issues.
V. FINDING A CURE
The ancillary effects of the medical malpractice amendments reveal that
Florida's citizen initiative process is in a quandary: special interest groups
propose self-serving amendments; initiatives are presented to Florida voters
without sufficient deliberation; the summarizing text of an initiative can
understate its wide-ranging socioeconomic effects; there is no substantive
review of the initiatives; enactments of laws that affect everyone only require
the support of half the electorate. The procedural and substantive
deficiencies are numerous. However, there is a disparity amongst scholars
as to the best course of action. Arguably, there are five potential methods of
remedying the initiative process: (1) make it procedurally more difficult to
amend the constitution; (2) restrict the content of proposed amendments; (3)
give a branch of the state government more control over the citizen initiative
process; (4) allow citizens to propose statutes by initiative; and (5) increase
deliberation about initiative amendments.' °9
There are procedural modifications that can increase the difficulty of
placing an amendment on the Florida ballot, especially alterations to the
signature requirement."o The legislature has the power to shorten the length
of time initiative committees have to gather signatures,"' and could require
'10 See id. at 8 n.29. Florida had numerous privileged review systems including peer review,
credentialing, medical review committees, risk management, and quality assurance and patient safety
initiatives.
109 See Ryan Maloney, Smoking Laws, High-speed Trains, and Fishing Nets a State Constitution Does
Not Make: Florida's Desperate Need for a Statutory Initiative, 14 U. FLA J.L. & PUB. PO'Y 93, 117 (2002)
(identifying four potential categories of remedy).
110 See id. at 117-118.
III Signatures in Florida are valid for a period of 4 years. See FLA. STAT. S 100.371(2). This length
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a greater percentage of signatures to get an amendment on the ballot." 2 Still,
had both of these procedural requirements been in place in 2004, the medical
malpractice amendments would have still reached the ballot. Considering
interest groups use for-profit signature gatherers, that in some cases will
guarantee ballot qualification, the aforementioned procedural modifications
would merely raise the cost of placing an amendment on the ballot."3 As
signature-gathering becomes more costly, grassroots groups are hampered by
such a burden but national consulting groups that influence, and in some
cases manipulate the process, are not. 1 4 Initiatives were originally conceived
for grassroots groups to circumvent legislative bodies that citizens believed
were overly influenced by special interest groups. Instituting stricter
signature requirements would paradoxically hinder access to the ballot to
everyone but groups like the Florida Medical Association or Florida Academy
of Trial Lawyers." 5  However, as discussed below, a supermajority
requirement for the passage of constitutional amendments is an effective
procedural method of filtering amendments that only have moderate support
of the electorate"
6
Some scholars support the notion of restricting the content of proposed
citizen initiatives. This idea is rooted in the fact that the Florida Constitution
is a power-limiting document, not a mere statute with the purpose of
regulating private behavior." 7 Unlike the governmental power of the United
States which flows directly or impliedly from its Constitution,"' a state's
governmental power is inherent. The Florida Constitution is actually a
limitation on that inherent power." 9 One commentator suggests disallowing
all citizen initiatives that seek to "accomplish a purpose that is within the
power of the Florida Legislature to accomplish by law." 2' Although this
of time exceeds all other states with a constitutional initiative process. See Maloney, supra note 110, at 118.
112 FLA. CONST. art. Xl, S 3. Discussed supra Part Ill(A).
113 See Jameson & Hosack, supra note 19, at 446. Some initiative committees pay professional
signature gatherers up to $2.50 a signature. Id. at 448.
114 See NOVEMBER 8 MEETING: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS IN
FLORIDA-CITIZEN INITIATIVE, http:/web.clas.ufl.edu/askew/meeting/Fall2002memo.pdf (last visited
May 10, 2006).
115 See Jameson & Hosack, supra note 19, at 446.
116 See infia Part V(A)(1).
117 See Joseph W. Little, Does Direct Dernocracy Threaten Constitutional Governance in Florida?, 24
STETSON L. REV. 393, 409-410 (1995).
118 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
119 JOHN F. COOPER & THOMAS C. MARKS,JR., FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1 (3d. ed. 2001). Consequentially, a statute enacted by the legislature may not restrict a right
granted under the Constitution. See Austin v. Christian, 310 So.2d 289,293 (Fla. 1975).
120 See Little, supra note 117, at 410. Little rationalizes this substantive limitation on constitutional
amendments:
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prevents interest groups from proposing initiatives like the medical
malpractice amendments, it runs contrary to the very reason Florida
instituted the citizen initiative in the first place: allowing citizens to
circumvent the legislature when elected officials perceivably fail to address
certain issues through legislation. 12' Another scholar. advocates prohibiting
initiatives that involve limited economic or social interests, and recommends
the Supreme Court of Florida have jurisdiction to determine whether an
initiative proposal involves such a limited interest." Implementing this
restriction is arguably unlawful, and markedly improbable. First, increasing
the present jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court" to include the
authority to restrict amendments on the basis of merit seems an
impermissible restriction of the separation of powers doctrine. Second, a
proposal to exclude certain initiatives requires modifying the current
constitution and thus needs the approval of Florida voters. 24 It is unlikely
the electorate will limit their power of direct democracy in light of the
overwhelming support of citizen initiatives in recent years.
For these same reasons, it is doubtful the electorate will grant a branch
of the state government more control over the initiative process.'2 However,
executive, judicial, or legislative scrutiny might be welcomed if the specific
branch was afforded non-binding authority to merely opine the merits and
wisdom of an amendment. Regarding the executive branch, some suggest a
review of proposed initiative language by a state agency that could include
non-binding suggestions for improving an initiative's technical format and
[T] he constitution is not a vehicle for making positive law, but it is an instrument to limit and
control what laws the government shall have the authority to make and what powers the
government shall be permitted to exercise. This being true, to burden the constitution with
provisions that are merely legislative in nature (i.e., to impose a particular tax, to authorize a
particular form of gambling, or to prohibit a particular kind of fishing) is a misuse of the
document and of the principle ofAmerican state constitutionalism.
Id.
121 Id. at 399.
122 See Daniel R. Gordon, Protecting Against the State Constitutional LawyJunkyard: Proposals to Limit
Popular Constitutional Revision in Florida, 20 NOvA L. REv. 413, 429 (1995) (suggesting the 1998
Constitutional Revision Commission implement ways to inhibit the initiative process in Florida). In
addition to restricting self-serving economic and social changes, Gordon also suggested the approval of
60% of electors for initiatives involving changes to article I, to article X, section 4, or to any initiative that
the Supreme Court of Florida in its pre-election review deems will limit equality or equal protection. Id.
123 FLA. CONST. art. V, S 3.
124 FLA. CONST. art. XI, S 5.
125 See Maloney, supra note 109, at 121 ("This is evinced by the fact that, in 1994, the people of
Florida voted to enlarge their power to propose constitutional amendments, approving a citizen initiative
amendment which exempted any future initiative 'limiting the power of government to raise revenue'
from the single subject requirement.").
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content. 126 In that same vein, allowing the Supreme Court to discuss
potential ramifications of such amendments in their advisory opinions might
prove effective. It certainly would have allowed the Florida Supreme Court
to voice its opinions as to the potential long term ramifications of the medical
malpractice amendments. Concerning the Legislature, an indirect
constitutional initiative process, although uncommon, might have alleviated
some of the problems in the 2004 election.12 7 Indirect processes require that
initiatives are submitted to the Legislature before being placed on the
ballot.12 1 In Mississippi, for example, the Legislature can adopt, amend, or
reject an initiative, but the initiative still goes on the ballot. 29  If the
Legislature alters the initiative, both proposals go on the ballot and voters get
to choose between them. 13°
Although each governmental branch potentially has the ability to filter
the content of initiatives, it requires the difficult process of convincing the
Florida electorate to allow a governmental body to interfere with its
lawmaking ability. Instead, this Article proposes more feasible changes: (1)
increase the approval percentage required to pass a constitutional initiative;
(2) increase the length of the ballot summary to more than 75 words; (3)
adopt a statutory process; and (4) develop ways to improve debate,
deliberation, and compromise on initiatives.' A statutory initiative coupled
with increased voter knowledge alleviates many problems.
A. Preventative Medicine
1. PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS
First, initiatives should require a higher percentage of voter approval. "It
is hard to amend the Constitution and it ought to be hard." 132 Gaining the
support of the majority of the electorate, however, would be difficult
considering such an amendment limits citizen access to direct democracy. 33
Yet, the desire to protect the integrity of the constitution, coupled with the
126 See NOVEMBER 8 MEETING: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS IN FLORIDA -
CITIZEN INITIATIVE, http:/web.clas.ufl.edu/askew/meeting/Fall2002memo.pdf (last visited May 10, 2006).
127 See Jameson & Hosack, supra note 19, at 434.
128 Id.
129 MISS. CONST. art. 15, S 273. The Mississippi Constitution also limits the number of initiatives
on one ballot to five. Id.
130 Id.
131 See NOVEMBER 8 MEETING: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS IN FLORIDA -
CITIZEN INITIATIVE, http;/Aweb.clas.ufl.edu/askew/meeting/FaU2002memo.pdf(Last visited May 10, 2006).
132 Weber v. Smathers, 338 So.2d 819, 824 (Fla. 1976) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
In See Jameson & Hosack, supra note 19, at 445.
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skepticism of others' attempts to amend it, may influence enough citizens to
pass such an amendment. 34 Depending on the percentage, perhaps this
alone would not have prevented the controversial medical malpractice
amendments from passing, since all received greater than 60% of the vote. 3 '
But, the supermajority requirement encourages the creation of a popular
consensus and ensures strong public support for any and all constitutional
changes.1
36
The second procedural modification this Article suggests better provides
the Florida electorate with information about the direct and ancillary affects
of citizen initiatives. It is within the power of the Legislature to modify the
ballot title and summary requirement. 37 Arguably, the fact that the ballot
summary is limited to 75 words does not allow drafters to sufficiently convey
the sum and substance of an amendment to the voting public. Perhaps more
importantly, the ballot summary is drafted by the initiative sponsor, rather
than an independent party, further increasing the risk of a potentially
misleading summary. Florida law needs to have an independent third party,
or a committee of both proponents and opponents, draft explanatory
statements for initiatives. 38
2. CREATING A STATUTORY INITIATIVE
The constitution is supposed to be the bastion of Florida law, not a
testing ground for new laws. The lack of a statutory initiative compels
citizens to enact amendments that are more appropriate as statutory
measures.'3 9 If Florida citizens are provided an alternative avenue to direct
democracy, like a statutory initiative, they may be more inclined to approve
the implementation of restrictions on amendments by initiatives.
However, in implementing a statutory initiative, scholars recognize that
various issues come into play, such as the direct or indirect nature of the
process, the roles of the other branches of government in reviewing and
134 Id.
135 See "A Look at the Trend of Ballot Initiatives," supra note 24.
136 See Gordon, supra note 122, at 429. Gordon further suggests that increasing the majority
requirement would discourage initiatives because it would make ultimate electoral success more difficult.
137 FLA. STAT. S 101.161(1) ("[T]he substance of the amendment or other public measure shall
be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure."
1s" See NOVEMBER 8 MEETING: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS IN FLORIDA -
CITIZEN INITIATIVE, http'/web.clas.ufl.edu/askew/meeting/Fall2002memo.pdf (last visited May 10, 2006)
("For example, a law recently enacted in Oregon requires a committee of five ... to draft the explanatory
statement for the initiative or referendum, to be included in the voters' pamphlet.").
139 See Jameson & Hosack, supra note 19, at 458.
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approving proposals, and the appropriate procedural requirements. "° The
signature requirement must require fewer signatures than a constitutional
initiative to incentivize sponsors to seek statutory changes, rather than
amendments. 14' An indirect statutory initiative method might alleviate many
of the problems evinced by the conflicting medical malpractice amendments.
But, a direct statutory initiative is a better compromise considering citizens
can already amend the constitution directly. A direct statutory initiative with
a lower voting requirement than a direct constitutional initiative would
undoubtedly curtail the number of amendment initiatives filed each year.
B. Palliative Care
Palliative care is basically treating a disease for which there is no cure.
Had a statutory initiative been available and more stringent voting require-
ments in place in 2004, the problematic medical malpractice amendments
might still have gained the favor of Florida voters. Initiative proposals do not
go through the same hearing process as amendments by the legislature, or the
constitutional revision commission, so voters only learn about the benefit or
detriment of the proposals through the media or advertising. Florida already
assists voters by providing information about the initiative process on the
website for the Florida Department of State.' 42 But, there is no law requiring
publication of voter information pamphlets; it is left to the discretion of
counties. 143 Florida should initiate public hearings, and require the publica-
tion and dissemination of voter information pamphlets to improve debate,
deliberation, and compromise on initiatives.' 44 Ideally, the creation of a
statutory initiative would also further public participation and debate. 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Thomas Jefferson said, "I know of no safe depository of the ultimate
powers of society but the people themselves; and if we think them not
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion,
the remedy is not to take it from them, but inform their discretion. " 146 If
140 See id. at 459.
141 Id.
142 See FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF ELECTIONS, http'J/election.dos.state.fl.usiindemhtmi (last
visited Apr. 12, 2006).
143 Id.
W4 Id.
145 See Jameson & Hosack, supra note 19, at 460.
14 "Trust for Representative Democracy Quotes," http://www.ncsl.org/public/trust/quotes.htm
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anything, the medical malpractice amendments do not evidence a misguided
electorate, but rather a faulty process of self-governance. The 2004 election
does not warrant the total removal of constitutional initiatives. Instead, it
necessitates improving Florida's system of amending the constitution.
By instituting a supermajority and a statutory initiative process, citizens
still have recourse against the legislature when it fails to enact desired
legislation. 147 Such a system encourages the use of the statutory initiative
rather than the constitutional initiative, thereby preserving the sanctity of the
Florida Constitution without significantly threatening the electorate's right
to a direct democracy. In addition, removing the 75 word limitation on the
ballot summary, coupled with the public hearings and the dissemination of
voter information pamphlets helps ensure voters are properly informed of
the true merits and potential outcomes of all proposed initiatives. Most
importantly, despite the present fallbacks of the citizen initiative process, and
the questionable value of the medical malpractice amendments, there is
comfort knowing the ultimate powers of society rest in the people
themselves.
(last visited May 11, 2006).
147 See Little, supra note 117, at 411- 4 12.

